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Re-examining Miller v Miller: A search for
rationality and coherence in Australia’s
illegality defence
Aiden Lerch and Yvonne Apolo*
While it has long been accepted that a ‘confirmed criminal is as much
entitled to redress as his most virtuous fellow citizen’,1 the defence of
illegality has the potential to entirely divest plaintiffs of private law remedies.
In light of the anomalous approach to the illegality defence adopted by the
High Court of Australia in Miller v Miller, this article considers whether
Australia’s illegality defence in the general law of torts requires
reformulation. In adopting a comparative approach, the article demonstrates
that although Australia’s duty-based illegality defence is criticised for being
unusual and indeed unjust, the discretionary-based approach implemented
within the United Kingdom is denounced as ‘intolerably uncertain’ and the
rule-based approach formulated in Canada is condemned for its narrow
scope and rigidity. In seeking to propose a future direction for the
development of Australia’s illegality defence in the context of tort law, this
article articulates and deploys a legal coherence framework within which the
various formulations of the illegality defence can be appraised.
I Introduction
The advantages of a clear, consistent and easily applicable principle of law are
readily discernible. However, sometimes the considerations behind the law are
complex and involve a multifarious range of factors that are not entirely
straightforward. In such a situation, judicial discretion is conferred to weigh
up these often-conflicting factors, as the law recognises that a simple legal
principle is unable to adequately address the intricate situation at hand.
The illegality defence has captivated the attention of courts and scholars
ever since its inception as it reflects this very problem.2 In the context of tort
law, the illegality defence involves a consideration of whether illegal conduct
on the part of a plaintiff, at the time that a tort is committed against that
plaintiff, should bar an otherwise successful claim for compensatory
* Aiden Lerch is the Associate to the Honourable Judge John Hatzistergos AM in the NSW
District Court and was awarded the University Medal in Law at the University of
Wollongong in 2018. Yvonne Apolo is a Career Development Fellow in the School of Law
at the University of Wollongong. The authors wish to thank Professor James Goudkamp,
Sophie Whittaker and the anonymous referee for their constructive comments on earlier
versions of this manuscript.
1 Olmstead v United States, 277 US 438, 484 (Brandeis J) (1928).
2 As Erbacher states, ‘[t]he law governing claims founded on illegal conduct has been in a
perpetually shambolic state for almost 250 years following Lord Mansfield’s sweeping
pronouncement ... that a court should not enforce a claim based on an illegal act’ in
Holman v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp 341, 98 ER 1120: Sharon Erbacher, ‘Another Misstep in
Negligence and Illegality’ (2017) 27 New Zealand Universities Law Review 1060, 1060.
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damages.3 Determining the effect of a plaintiff’s illegality on a claim in tort is
a particularly arduous task, as quite unusually, it involves a consideration of
both public law and private law rights.4 As a result, scholars, courts and judges
across the common law world are divided as to the proper application of the
illegality defence in the context of tort law.5
In Australia, the High Court first considered a defence of illegality in tort
law in the 1938 case of Henwood v Municipal Tramways Trust (SA).6 Ever
since, there has been significant debate over how the defence ought to be
conceptualised and the underlying purpose it should endeavour to achieve.7 In
the course of implementing civil liability reforms, State and Territory
parliaments ostensibly intervened in the debate. New South Wales (NSW),
South Australia (SA), Queensland (Qld), Tasmania (Tas), the Australian
Capital Territory (ACT) and the Northern Territory (NT) have all introduced
statutory illegality defences.8 These provisions similarly hold that a plaintiff
will not be awarded damages if a Court is satisfied that the plaintiff’s injury
occurred whilst engaged in illegal conduct,9 which contributed materially to
the plaintiff’s injury or to the risk of injury.10 In Qld, ACT, NT and SA the
3 See for example, Justin Tan, ‘Illegality as a defence in negligence: Judge Gilbert’s formula’
(2018) 25 Torts Law Journal 49.
4 This is because a court has to strike a balance between upholding the civil right to be
compensated for loss in tort law on the one hand, and not allowing plaintiffs to be
compensated for their criminal conduct on the other: Andrew Burrows, ‘Illegality After
Patel v Mirza’ (2017) 70 Current Legal Problems 55, 56.
5 See James Goudkamp, ‘The Defence of Joint Illegal Enterprise’ (2010) 34 Melbourne
University Law Review 425, 434–9; Ernest Weinrib, ‘Illegality as a Tort Defence’ (1976) 26
University of Toronto Law Journal 28, 39–54; Beverley McLachlin, ‘Weaving Law’s
Seamless Web: Reflections on the Illegality Defence in Tort Law’ in Andrew Dyson et al
(eds), Defences in Tort (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015) 207; Lord Jonathan Mance, ‘Ex
Turpi Causa — When Latin Avoids Liability’ (2014) 18 Edinburgh Law Review 175;
Lord Sumption JSC, ‘Reflections on the Law of Illegality’ (2012) 20 Restitution Law Review
1; Margaret Fordham, ‘The Role of Ex Turpi Causa in Tort Law’ [1998] Singapore Journal
of Legal Studies 238; Erbacher, ‘Another Misstep in Negligence and Illegality’, above n 2;
Robert Stevens, ‘Contributory Fault — Analogue or Digital?’ in Andrew Dyson et al (eds),
Defences in Tort (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015) 255; James Goudkamp, ‘The End of an
Era? Illegality in Private Law in the Supreme Court’ (2017) 133 Law Quarterly Review 14;
Harold Davis, ‘The Plaintiff’s Illegal Act as a Defense in Actions of Tort’ (1905) 18 Harvard
Law Review 505.
6 (1938) 60 CLR 438, in which it conceptualised the defence as being operative in those cases
where the legislature intended ‘to disentitle a person doing the prohibited act from
complaining of the other party’s neglect or default’ at 460.
7 See Smith v Jenkins (1970) 119 CLR 397; Progress & Properties Ltd v Craft (1976) 135
CLR 651; Jackson v Harrison (1978) 138 CLR 438; Gala v Preston (1991) 172 CLR 243.
8 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 94(1); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 54(1); Civil
Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 45(1); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 43(1); Civil Liability
Act 2002 (Tas) s 6; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) s 10(1).
9 NSW and Tas require the plaintiff to have committed a ‘serious offence’ (defined as one
punishable by imprisonment for 6 months or more); Qld, SA and the ACT require the
plaintiff to have committed an indictable offence; NT requires the plaintiff only to have
committed an offence that is punishable by imprisonment: ibid.
10 Note that the Western Australian statutory defence is entirely different from those proposed
by the other states and territories: see Offenders (Legal Action) 2000 (WA) s 5. In addition,
in Victoria s 14G(2) of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) simply requires courts to consider a
plaintiff’s illegality when determining whether there has been a breach of duty for the
purposes of establishing the tort of negligence.
220 (2019) 25 Torts Law Journal
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defence will not apply if a Court is satisfied that the application of the defence
would operate harshly and unjustly.11
Rather than clarifying the illegality defence in tort law, these provisions
have exacerbated its complexity in two distinct ways. The first pertains to the
nature of the test adopted by the legislature in determining the effect of a
plaintiff’s illegality. The majority of the statutory defences hold that a court is
not to award damages if a plaintiff’s illegal conduct ‘contributed materially’ to
the plaintiff’s injury or to the risk of injury. Since Australian courts had never
before used such a formulation of the defence, such a conception has been
described as an act of ‘legislative experimentation’,12 which is problematically
premised upon a complex (and vexed) question of causation.13
The second, and perhaps most interesting feature of these statutory
defences, is that a gap is left for the illegality defence at common law to
continue to apply in certain circumstances. For instance, in Victoria the
common law defence is the applicable law;14 however, in SA the statutory
defence does not affect the common law relating to joint illegal enterprises.15
In NSW, it is accepted that where the plaintiff is the only party who has
engaged in illegal conduct, then s 54 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) is
the applicable law. However, section 54 leaves room for the common law
defence to apply where the conduct of the defendant that caused the plaintiff’s
injury or death constitutes any kind of offence.16 What this means is that,
where both the plaintiff and the defendant have committed an illegal act at the
time of, or following, the commission of the tort, and in the case of NSW, the
defendant’s illegal conduct was also the cause of the plaintiff’s injury, then the
common law illegality defence remains the applicable law. Since the common
law defence of illegality has not been ousted by civil liability legislation,17 and
yet is often overlooked by courts, practitioners and academics alike, it is the
common law approach to the defence of illegality that this article is concerned
with.18
11 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 45(2); Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 94(2); Personal
Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) s 10(2); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA)
s 43(2). No explanation is given as to when such harsh or unjust circumstances will arise.
12 James Goudkamp, ‘Self Defence and Illegality under the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)’
(2010) 18 Torts Law Journal 61, 72.
13 Furthermore, the ‘contributed materially’ requirement draws its historical underpinnings
from the ‘material contribution’ exception to the usual ‘but for’ test of causation. This
exception has traditionally been utilised by plaintiffs in establishing the causation element in
negligence where their injury was as a result of cumulative causes: see Bonnington Castings
Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] 1 All ER 615, 618 (Lord Reid). Thus, its incorporation in the illegality
defence context now means that it is being used for the benefit of defendants, something that
was never contemplated by the common law.
14 See Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 14G(2).
15 Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 43(4)(c).
16 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 54(2). See also Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 3A(1),
which explicitly maintains the applicability of common law defences.
17 Its continued relevance is heightened by the observation that ‘[t]he illegality defence’s main
area of operation in practice concerns cases in which the plaintiff was injured while engaged
in a joint illegal enterprise with the defendant’: Carolyn Sappideen, Prue Vines and
Penelope Watson, Torts: Commentary and Materials (Thomson Reuters, 12th ed, 2016) 716.
18 In addition, in NSW the common law illegality defence will also be relevant to a negligence
action that occurs while driving a motor vehicle, as the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) does
not apply: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 3B(d)–(f). Motor accident claims are also
Re-examining Miller v Miller 221
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The High Court most recently considered the common law defence of
illegality in Miller v Miller,19 where the court endorsed an entirely different
conception from that introduced by the legislature. Rather than recognising
illegality as a full defence, as it does in all the other laws of obligation,20 the
High Court held that a plaintiff’s illegality operates as a salient feature that
ought to be taken into account when determining whether a duty of care is
owed in negligence.21 As a result, this ‘defence’ is only applicable in the tort
of negligence.22 According to the High Court’s formulation, in order to
maintain legal coherence the illegality defence must prevent a duty of care
from arising in all negligence claims that would undermine or stultify the
purpose of the statute governing the plaintiff’s criminal conduct.23
Interestingly, it is for the court to determine what the ‘purpose’ of the statute
is and whether the plaintiff’s claim will undermine it.24
While the statutory illegality defences have attracted scholarly critique,25
the common law illegality defence has been left relatively unexplored within
Australian tort law scholarship. In particular, there is an absence of
scholarship specifically endorsing and propounding arguments in support of
the approach taken by the High Court in Miller v Miller. Furthermore, limited
attention has been devoted to scrutinising the reasoning of the court.26 In light
of both the anomalous approach adopted in this case and the comparative lack
of academic attention it has attracted, there seems to be ample reason to
re-examine the High Court’s formulation of the defence. This view is further
strengthened when considering the conceptions of the illegality defence
espoused in comparable common law jurisdictions. In the United Kingdom
(‘UK’) for instance, a majority of the UK Supreme Court (‘UKSC’) settled the
generally excluded from the scope of civil liability legislation in Queensland (Civil Liability
Act 2003 (Qld) s 5) and the Northern Territory (Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages)
Act 2003 (NT) s 4). Indeed, most of the cases that give rise to a defence of joint illegality
involve motor vehicles.
19 (2011) 242 CLR 446.
20 That is, contract law, the law of trusts, tort law and unjust enrichment: see generally
Andrew Burrows, Understanding the Law of Obligations (Hart Publishing, 2000).
21 Miller v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446, 454 [13]. The illegality defence in Australia at common
law can only be used as a defence to the tort of negligence, as there is no duty of care
requirement in intentional torts. The High Court however, did not give any justification for
such reasoning.
22 Ibid. This was confirmed in Croucher v Cachia (2016) 95 NSWLR 117, 126 [39]
(Leeming JA).
23 Miller v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446, 454–5 [16], [101] 481–2. This is a similar approach to
that which the court adopted in relation to the defence of unilateral illegality in Henwood v
Municipal Tramways Trust (SA) (1938) 60 CLR 438, described at above n 6.
24 Ibid.
25 See generally James Goudkamp, ‘A Revival of the Doctrine of Attainder? The statutory
Illegality Defences to Liability in Tort’ (2007) 29 Sydney Law Review 445; Po Jen Yap,
‘Rethinking the Illegality Defence in Tort Law’ (2010) 18 Tort Law Review 52; Goudkamp,
‘Self Defence and Illegality under the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)’, above n 12, 61.
26 Although see Fleming’s scathing criticism of such an approach in John Fleming, The Law of
Torts (Law Book Co, 1957) 139, 279–80. See also the critiques provided in: McLachlin,
above n 5; Erbacher, ‘Another Misstep in Negligence and Illegality’, above n 2;
Sharon Erbacher, Negligence and Illegality (Bloomsbury Publishing PLC, 2017) 128–9.
222 (2019) 25 Torts Law Journal
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debate27 over the illegality defence in the relatively recent case of Patel v
Mirza.28 Interestingly, the conception of the defence that the court adopted is
in complete conflict with Australia’s approach in tort law.29
This development, combined with the complexity that has traditionally
surrounded this area of law, leaves Australia’s common law illegality defence
in a precarious position. In pursuit of greater stability and reason, this article
will critically evaluate the Australian conception of the illegality defence
deployed in the context of tort law and will contrast this approach with
formulations adopted in other common law jurisdictions. This article
ultimately seeks to shed new light on the future direction of the defence by
proposing an alternative formulation that can better achieve the purported
purpose of the illegality defence in tort.
As a necessary first step in achieving this aim, Part II of this article will
engage with scholarship concerning the illegality defence in order to uncover
the rationale that most persuasively accounts for the recognition of such a
defence in the context of tort law. As the proceeding paragraphs have alluded
to, the preservation of legal coherence (particularly between actions in
negligence and the relevant criminal law regulating the plaintiff’s conduct) is
the most cited and defensible justification for the defence. Nevertheless, legal
coherence is quite an obscure and ambiguous objective. As a result, Part II will
unpack the meaning of legal coherence, before introducing a unique
framework for a legal coherence analysis. It is this framework that will then
be deployed throughout the remainder of the article to appraise the various
forms of the illegality defence recognised at common law.
Specifically, in Part III attention will be devoted to examining the
Australian conception of the illegality defence in tort law, as articulated by the
High Court in Miller v Miller. In Part IV, this Australian methodology will be
contrasted with the distinct approaches adopted in Canada and the UK.30
Following this comparative analysis, a preliminary conclusion will be reached
regarding the conception of the illegality defence that appears to most
satisfactorily promote legal coherence.
In Part V, this preliminary conclusion will be tested via the use of a case
study designed to assess the practical application of each conception of the
illegality defence in the context of tort law.31 This article will then conclude
with a suggestion for the future direction of the defence in Australia.
27 See Gray v Thames Trains Ltd [2009] 1 AC 1339; Hounga v Allen [2014] 1 WLR 2889; Les
Laboratoires Server v Apotex Inc [2015] AC 430; Bilta (UK) Ltd (in liq) v Nazir [No 2]
[2016] AC 1.
28 [2017] AC 467.
29 Interestingly, however, Lord Toulson JSC (writing for the majority) drew on Australia’s
conception of the illegality defence in equity in Nelson v Nelson (1995) 184 CLR 538 to
highlight that a discretionary approach should be used when applying the defence: Patel v
Mirza [2017] AC 467, 486–8 [50]–[54].
30 These jurisdictions have been selected not only for the reason that they each represent
comparable common law systems, but also because their respective conceptions of the
illegality defence have significant scholarly support.
31 This method is well known in the context of feminist legal scholarship: Nancy Naples,
Feminism and Method: Ethnography, Discourse Analysis, and Activist Research (Routledge,
2013) 24, 261. However, it has also been used by tort law scholars: see James Goudkamp
Re-examining Miller v Miller 223
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II The importance of legal coherence: An analytical
framework
Central to assessing the validity of a law is to consider the purpose for which
it was created.32 It follows that a principled appraisal of the common law
illegality defence will only be effective if its purpose is properly understood.
To that end, this Part will be structured into three key sections. The first
section will explore the underlying rationale for the recognition of the
illegality defence in the context of tort law. The second section will engage
with relevant scholarship in order to advance a sophisticated understanding of
this rationale: namely, the pursuit of legal coherence. On the foundations of a
nuanced appreciation of the distinction between legal coherence, on the one
hand, and legal consistency on the other, the third section will construct and
articulate a framework for a legal coherence analysis of the illegality defence
that will be used throughout the remainder of the article.
A Uncovering the rationale for the defence of illegality
When the High Court first considered the defence of illegality in Henwood v
Municipal Tramways Trust (SA), the effect of a plaintiff’s illegality was
discussed not as a separate and distinct defence, but in the context of a claim
for contributory negligence.33 Nevertheless, when apportionment legislation
was subsequently introduced,34 the High Court in Smith v Jenkins used
English authority to hold that illegality on the part of a plaintiff was a complete
defence.35 Ever since this severance, there has been debate regarding the
underlying rationale for the recognition of such a defence in the law of torts.
Discernible within the relevant academic and judicial commentary are four
common justifications; each of which is explored below.
1 Deterrence
One of the first arguments advanced for the existence of the defence of
illegality was premised on the notion of deterrence. In Godbolt v Fittock,36 the
NSW Supreme Court held that by preventing a plaintiff from being
compensated due to their illegal conduct, plaintiffs would generally be
deterred from engaging in criminal behaviour.37 Unsurprisingly, however,
many commentators have rejected this rationale for the fundamental reason
that it is highly unlikely that a person who is considering whether to commit
and Lorenz Mayr, ‘The Doctrine of Illegality and Interference with Chattels’ in Andrew
Dyson et al (eds), Defences in Tort (Hart Publishing, 2015) 223. This further justifies the
decision to use such a method.
32 Joseph Raz, ‘Kelsen’s Theory of the Basic Norm’ (1974) 19 American Journal of
Jurisprudence 94, 99.
33 When it was once a complete defence.
34 See, eg Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW) s 9(1).
35 Smith v Jenkins (1970) 119 CLR 397, 399–403 (Kitto J).
36 [1964] NSWR 22.
37 Ibid 29. See also Thackwell v Barclays Bank plc [1986] 1 All ER 676, 689; Euro-Diam Ltd v
Bathurst [1990] 1 QB 1, 35.
224 (2019) 25 Torts Law Journal
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a criminal offence, will be thinking about the availability of compensation in
the law of tort.38 As explained by Goudkamp:
If the threat of criminal penalties fails to deter a plaintiff from committing an
offence, it seems quite fanciful to think that the potential loss of a remedy in tort that
may have otherwise been enjoyed in the event of sustaining injury while committing
the offence will do so.39
2 Punishment
Some courts40 and scholars41 have argued that the illegality defence can be
justified according to the logic that it punishes the plaintiff. Again, however,
the majority of scholarship within this field has rejected this policy basis.42
There are three primary reasons argued for its rejection. Firstly, McLachlin
opines that punishment of the plaintiff is not a purpose of tort law and
therefore such a policy argument cannot be justified within it.43 Secondly,
Virgo highlights that the defence may apply even if the plaintiff has already
been punished by the criminal law. It therefore cannot be justified as a
punishment because doing so would subject plaintiffs to an inexcusable
double punishment.44 Thirdly, Goudkamp has identified that even if a plaintiff
deserves punishment, the defence of illegality is an inappropriate way of
delivering it. This is because the defence acts to totally bar a plaintiff’s claim.
As a result, the plaintiff’s punishment will be commensurate to the amount
that they were entitled to claim, which is ultimately determined by the
measure of loss the plaintiff has suffered due to the defendant’s tort.45 This
form of punishment is, therefore, irrational and disproportionate as it is
determined by the level of injury caused by the tort rather than by a measured
decision based on the plaintiff’s relative culpability.46
38 McLachlin, above n 5, 213; Goudkamp, ‘Self Defence and Illegality under the Civil
Liability Act 2002 (NSW)’, above n 12, 68; W J Ford, ‘Tort and Illegality: The Ex Turpi
Causa Defence in Negligence Law’ (1977) 11 Melbourne University Law Review 32, 183;
Yap, above n 25, 64; Graham Virgo, ‘Illegality’s Role in the Law of Torts’ in Matthew Dyson
(ed), Unravelling Tort and Crime (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 174, 187.
39 Goudkamp, ‘A Revival of the Doctrine of Attainder?’, above n 25, 452.
40 Tinsley v Milligan [1992] Ch 310, 334.
41 Allen Linden, Canadian Tort Law (Butterworths, 5th ed, 1993) 473.
42 McLachlin, above n 5, 212; Goudkamp, ‘Self Defence and Illegality under the Civil
Liability Act 2002 (NSW)’, above n 12, 67–8; Ford, above n 38, 185; Virgo, ‘Illegality’s
Role in the Law of Torts’, above n 38, 188; D Gibson, ‘Torts: Illegality of Plaintiff’s Conduct
as a Defence’ (1969) 47 Canadian Bar Review 89, 91.
43 McLachlin, above n 5, 212. It is also worth noting that whilst exemplary damages may be
awarded in tort law proceedings ‘to punish the defendant’ (Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd
(1966) 117 CLR 118, 149), the High Court of Australia has described this remedy as
‘exceptional’ (Gray v Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR 1, 9 [20]). Moreover, the
High Court considers the fact that the defendant has also been punished by the criminal law
as a factor that may exclude the award of exemplary damages, as ‘considerations of double
punishment would otherwise arise’ (Gray v Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR 1,
14 [43]). Thus, notwithstanding the phenomenon of exemplary damages, punishment is
rarely advanced as a valid purpose of tort law.
44 Virgo, ‘Illegality’s Role in the Law of Torts’, above n 38, 188.
45 James Goudkamp, ‘The Defence of Joint Illegal Enterprise’ (2010) 34 Melbourne University
Law Review 425, 442; Erbacher, Negligence and Illegality, above n 26, 39–42.
46 Ibid.
Re-examining Miller v Miller 225
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3 Preventing wrongful profiting
A fundamental principle of the common law is that a court must never allow
a party to profit from his or her own wrong.47 A line of reasoning has therefore
based the rationale for the illegality defence on preventing plaintiffs from
profiting from their illegal actions.48 Yet, this rationale has also been rejected
by a majority of scholars in the field for the primary reason that tort law
generally compensates only for loss.49 Therefore, plaintiffs will generally
never profit from their illegal conduct by making a claim in tort. As pointed
out by McLachlin and Glofcheski however, this is subject to two exceptions:
where a plaintiff seeks exemplary damages50 or is seeking compensation for
a loss of illegal earnings (a loss of income from being unable to commit
further crimes).51 Thus, other than in these two circumstances, this policy
reason is widely unsupported in the context of tort law.
4 Coherence in the law
Legal coherence, first articulated and endorsed by Weinrib,52 is widely
accepted as the soundest justification for the existence of the illegality defence
in tort law in the Australian,53 Canadian54 and English55 jurisdictions. In
Canada, for instance, McLachlin J (as she then was) cited Weinrib’s work in
the landmark judgment of Hall v Hebert, where she described the coherence
rationale in the following terms:56
[T]he law must aspire to be a unified institution, the parts of which — contract, tort
the criminal law — must be in essential harmony. For the courts to punish conduct
with one hand while rewarding it with the other would be ‘to create an intolerable
fissure in the law’s conceptually seamless web’.57
This rationale holds that the illegality defence will be justified in tort law
where the ordinary principles of tort would lead to an outcome that is
incoherent with other bodies of law, such that it would be ‘harmful to the
integrity of the legal system’.58 An example of such incoherence is where a
47 See Cleaver v Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association [1892] 1 QB 147, 158.
48 See Meah v McCreamer [No 2] [1986] 1 All ER 943, 951; Mark Law and Rebecca Ong, ‘He
who comes to Equity need not do so with clean hands?: illegality and resulting trusts after
Patel v Mirza, what should the approach be?’ (2017) 23 Trusts and Trustees 880, 889–90.
49 McLachlin, above n 5, 213; Goudkamp, ‘Self Defence and Illegality under the Civil
Liability Act 2002 (NSW)’, above n 12, 68; Yap, above n 25, 64; Virgo, ‘Illegality’s Role in
the Law of Torts’, above n 38, 185–7; Weinrib, ‘Illegality as a Tort Law Defence’, above n 5,
40–3; Erbacher, above n 26, 36–9.
50 As they are not compensatory in nature: McLachlin, above n 5, 213; Richard Glofcheski,
‘Plaintiff’s Illegality as a Bar to Recovery of Personal Injury Damages’ (1999) 19 Legal
Studies 6, 17–18.
51 In these situations, the plaintiff will be said to be using tort to profit from their criminal
actions: Ibid.
52 See generally Weinrib, ‘Illegality as a Tort Law Defence’, above n 5.
53 Miller v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446, 454 [15].
54 Hall v Hebert [1993] 2 SCR 159, 176.
55 Patel v Mirza [2017] AC 467, 499 [99].
56 [1993] 2 SCR 159, 176.
57 Ibid.
58 Hall v Hebert [1993] 2 SCR 159, 169; Patel v Mirza [2017] AC 467, 490 [61], 494 [77], 499
[100]–[101].
226 (2019) 25 Torts Law Journal
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plaintiff uses the law of torts to deflect a criminal penalty.59 Various scholars
have argued that coherence in the law is necessary because it is essential in
justifying law’s normative force to those who are subject to it.60 As McLachlin
explains:
Coherence is essential to justification. When a justification lacks coherence, the legal
relationships it orders become arbitrary. By coherence I mean more than mere
consistency. A set of rules are mutually consistent if they do not contradict one
another. By contrast, coherence ‘is the property of a set of propositions which, taken
together, “make sense” in its entirety’.61
The illegality defence therefore operates as a principle that prevents tort law
from coming into conflict with other areas of law (in particular criminal law),
thus maintaining the integrity of tort law’s authority to coerce.
While legal coherence is widely accepted as underpinning the defence of
illegality, there is very little scrutiny of this justification. Both McLachlin and
Weinrib, however, are critical of the legal coherence rationale being used too
broadly. They acknowledge the different objectives of criminal law and tort
law and state that the coherence principle does not necessarily mean that the
principles of the criminal law should be given disproportionate attention, such
that they otherwise forsake those of tort.62
Despite McLachlin and Weinrib’s attenuated support for the coherence
rationale, current literature has seemingly failed to consider their concerns.
Moreover, existing tort law scholarship has largely failed to articulate the
‘type’ of legal coherence that ought to be maintained. Accordingly, the next
section of this article will engage with legal coherence literature to arrive at
a well-reasoned and nuanced understanding of the form of coherence that
could effectively guide the application of the illegality defence in tort law.
B Understanding ‘legal coherence’
Literature on the theory of legal coherence is extensive.63 In the context of the
common law world, MacCormick influentially described the role of coherence
59 Weinrib gives a useful example (‘Illegality as a Tort Law Defence’, above n 5, 50–1):
Two burglars steal into a house with criminal intent. As a result of burglar A’s careless
failure to de-activate the alarm system they are both caught, convicted in a criminal
prosecution, and sentenced to pay a fine. Burglar B then sues A in tort to recover the
amount of the fine, alleging that A should have foreseen the harmful consequences that
would result from his negligently performing his part in the burglary ... Conviction and
sentencing by a criminal court is the law’s method of ascribing to B the responsibility for
his action ... It would make no sense at all if B were able to utilize tort law’s mechanism
of shifting losses in order to avoid the very consequences which criminal law has
imposed upon him for his intentionally culpable conduct.
60 Ibid, 50–4; Erbacher, above n 2, 1063; McLachlin, above n 5, 218–20; Goudkamp, ‘Self
Defence and Illegality under the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)’, above n 12, 68–9.
61 McLachlin, above n 5, 219 (emphasis added).
62 Ibid 220; Weinrib, ‘Illegality as a Tort Law Defence’, above n 5, 44.
63 See generally Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press, 1986);
Neil MacCormick, Legal Right and Social Democracy: Essays in Legal and Political
Philosophy (Clarendon Press, 1984); Aleksander Peczenik, On Law and Reason (Springer,
1989); Jack Balkin, ‘Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the
Problem of Legal Coherence’ (1993) 103 Yale Law Journal 105; Amalia Amaya, The
Tapestry of Reason: An Inquiry into the Nature of Coherence and its Role in Legal Argument
(Hart Publishing, 2015).
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as ‘second-order justification’; that is, justification required in order for judges
to choose an appropriate proposition of law in hard cases.64 Coherence,
therefore, involves ‘the multitudinous rules of a legal system ...“mak[ing]
sense” when taken together’.65 In a similar vein, Balkin describes the role of
coherence in law as a form of normative coherence, or justification, explaining
that ‘values and judgments are normatively coherent if they employ
distinctions and similarities that are principled and reasonable as opposed to
those which are arbitrary and unreasonable.’66 As such, in the context of the
illegality defence, the pursuit of coherence serves to both shape and justify
difficult judicial choices concerning the circumstances in which an unlawful
act will prevent an individual from complaining of an injury wrongfully
inflicted by another.
An important consequence of these influential accounts of legal coherence,
is that the concept of coherence must be distinguished from that of
consistency.67 That is, coherence is not achieved simply by making legal
principles identical throughout the various areas of law. This is because, as
MacCormick has observed, a set of principles that do not contradict each other
can still involve the pursuit of no intelligible value.68 Thus, a legal system can
still be described as coherent where the many areas of the common law, such
as tort, contract, and trust are underpinned by a variety of disparate policies
and principles that aim to achieve differing goals, and which subsequently
lead to differing outcomes.
A second valuable point that is derived from legal coherence scholarship is
that a legal system will not be coherent if it emanates from a single
all-applicable principle. Rather, Balkin explains that the law will be coherent
if it can be viewed as emanating from a set of principles and policies.69 He
further argues that ‘these principles and policies do not have to stem from a
single master principle or policy, nor do they have to be mutually
interdependent so that if one goes they all go’.70 In the context of private law,
therefore, it cannot be said that the law of obligations must stem from a single
principle. To be legally and logically coherent, each branch of law must be
founded upon a unique set of principles and policies that shape, orient and
inform the body of law within it. Consequently, as Weinrib recognised,71 a
‘doctrinal transplantation’, in the sense of taking a principle from one area of
law and replacing it within another, would lead to incoherence. This is because
such a transplantation is premised upon there being a single all-applicable
principle across each doctrine, and it therefore ignores the often-conflicting
principles and policies that have been developed in each area of the common
law over an extensive period of time. As an example, Australian and English
courts have ensured that the assessment of damages in contract and tort are
64 Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Clarendon Press, 1994) 100.
65 Ibid 152.
66 Balkin, above n 63, 114.
67 See also MacCormick, Legal Right and Social Democracy, above n 63, 38.
68 Ibid 39. See also Amaya, above n 63, 13.
69 Balkin, above n 63, 116–17.
70 Ibid.
71 See Weinrib, ‘Illegality as a Tort Law Defence’, above n 5, 44.
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based on distinct tests,72 reflecting the divergent ways of conceiving loss in
each area of law.73 It would be irrational to make the tests identical in the mere
pursuit of legal coherence.
Finally, scholars have recognised that legal coherence may need to be
attenuated in order to achieve some other end, particularly where that end calls
for progressive legal development. As explained by Amaya:
Coherentist inference in law may not only be objected to on the grounds of vicious
circularity, but it also seems to be unduly conservative. Coherence theories of legal
justification have a built-in conservative tendency insofar as they make the
justification of new elements depend on their coherence with a pre-existing
structure. This conservative trend is an obstacle to normative change and legal
innovation and, in morally deficient legal systems, it leads to committing new
injustices in the name of coherence with a settled body of law.74
Amaya’s warning that a strict compliance with legal coherence will lead to
conservative outcomes has also been echoed by Goudkamp and Mayr in the
specific context of tort law, who argue that the ruthless pursuit of coherence
may result in important values being unjustifiably sacrificed.75 Such
observations must therefore be kept in mind when making a decision in the
name of legal coherence.
Four principled conclusions can be derived from this discussion, which
cumulatively enrich our understanding of the necessary distinction between
legal coherence, on the one hand, and mere legal consistency on the other.
Firstly, in order to arrive at a legally coherent outcome, the reasoning
undertaken in the application of the illegality defence must transcend
‘doctrinal transplantation’ by valuing the distinctive policies and principles
that underpin each facet of the common law.76 Secondly, in the course of such
reasoning, substantive attention should be devoted to the principles and
policies of the area of law in which the decision is to be made before the
principles of other areas of law are considered.77 Thirdly, legal coherence
theory allows for the various areas of law to reach different outcomes on the
basis of their unique doctrines and policies, so long as such outcomes are
principled and reasonable, as opposed to arbitrary and unreasonable.78 Finally,
a strict implementation of legal coherence, in the sense of making all
outcomes consistent, can risk unduly impeding legal progress and generating
circular outcomes that lead to injustice.79 The rigid pursuit of legal coherence
72 See Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Ex Rep 850, 855 (contract) and Livingstone v Rawyards
Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas 25, 39 (tort).
73 See Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1 where the High Court examined the reasons for
the differing tests.
74 Amaya, above n 63, 474.
75 Goudkamp and Mayr, above n 31, 243.
76 MacCormick, Legal Right and Social Democracy, above n 63, 39; Amaya, above n 63, 13.
77 This is because it cannot be said that all of the areas of the common law stem from one
principle: Balkin, above n 63, 114–17.
78 For example, it was in response to the fact that contract law did not provide a remedy to the
plaintiff in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] UKHL 100 that the tort of negligence was
expanded. While it could be suggested that tort and contract exist in a state of conflict, it
would be unreasonable to suggest that because the law of contract did not recognise any
remedy, the law of torts should also deny a remedy.
79 Amaya, above n 63, 474; Goudkamp and Mayr, above n 31, 243.
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should therefore be avoided, so as to not undermine the central logic of the
coherence rationale: to justify law’s coercive force by rendering rational and
reasonable outcomes.
The foregoing analysis can beneficially enhance the present debate over the
proper conception of the illegality defence in tort.
C The analytical legal coherence framework: in brief
Although legal coherence is widely accepted as the primary justification for
the illegality defence in tort, its meaning and parameters have been relatively
unexplored by Australian tort law scholars. Based on the foregoing analysis of
the legal coherence rationale, this article proposes the following framework
for the analysis, development and application of the illegality defence in tort:
(i) The analysis that informs whether the defence should be applied
must value the distinctive principles and policies that underpin each
area of the common law;
(ii) The principles and policies of tort law must be given considerable
weight, given that this is the area of law in which the claim has
proceeded;
(iii) The application of the defence to prevent a claim in tort must be
reasonable and intelligible, rather than arbitrary and unreasonable;
and
(iv) A strict adoption of legal coherence in pursuit of doctrinal
consistency should be avoided.
It is our contention that the form of the defence that most satisfactorily adheres
to the mandates of this framework will be better able to advance the purported
purpose of the illegality defence in tort. With this analytical framework in
mind, the remainder of the article will now critically examine the conceptions
of the illegality defence in tort law in Australia, Canada and the UK.
III Australia’s conception of the illegality defence:
Examining Miller v Miller
As stated in Part I, in the leading case of Miller v Miller80 the High Court of
Australia formulated and deployed a conception of the illegality defence in
tort, which was entirely different from that implemented by the legislature.81
In light of the limited scholarly attention received by the decision, this Part of
the article will first examine the reasoning and approach of the High Court,
before deploying the analytical legal coherence framework to appraise the
extent to which the Australian formulation of the illegality defence aligns with
its underlying rationale.
A The facts and decision of Miller v Miller
On 17 May 1998, the plaintiff, 16-year-old Danelle Miller, her older sister and
younger cousin were attempting to make their way home from a nightclub.
80 (2011) 242 CLR 446.
81 Since the claim was originally brought in Western Australia, the relevant legislative
provision is the Offenders (Legal Action) Act 2000 (WA) s 5.
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Since they had missed the last train and were unable to pay for a taxi, they
decided to steal a car. As they were leaving the car park, the defendant, a
27-year-old relative named Maurin, asked the women if he could drive the
stolen vehicle. Danelle agreed. Following this, five of the defendant’s friends
climbed into the vehicle, consequently overloading the sedan. On the way
home, Maurin initially drove sensibly until he then began to speed and drive
through red lights. Danelle asked him on numerous occasions to slow down
and then to stop and let her out. Maurin refused and kept driving. Shortly after,
he lost control of the car and it struck a kerb. Danelle was rendered tetraplegic.
She sued in negligence, alleging that Maurin’s negligent driving caused her
injury. Counsel for Maurin argued that Danelle and Maurin entered into a joint
criminal enterprise to use a car without the consent of the owner, contrary to
s 371A of the Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA). Therefore,
because both Danelle and Maurin were allegedly acting illegally,82 it was
argued that the illegality defence at common law applied to defeat Danelle’s
claim.
The High Court83 ultimately found that Danelle had withdrawn from the
joint criminal enterprise and was not acting illegally at the time of the tort. As
a result, the illegality defence did not apply.84 However, the court then went
on to discuss whether the defence would have applied if Danelle had not
withdrawn from the enterprise. In this way, the High Court’s analysis of the
illegality defence, while influential, is strictly obiter dicta.85
Within its judgment, the court firstly identified that the primary rationale for
the illegality defence is to preserve the coherence of the legal system.86 Armed
with this understanding, it then propounded the test for the illegality defence
in tort law in the following terms:
Ultimately, the question is: would it be incongruous for the law to proscribe the
plaintiff’s conduct and yet allow recovery in negligence for damage suffered in the
82 It is to be remembered here that the illegality defence under the Civil Liability Acts will not
apply where both the plaintiff and defendant have acted illegally before, during or after the
commission of the tort: see eg, Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 54(2). The Western
Australian statutory illegality defence under the Offenders (Legal Action) Act 2000 (WA) is
different however, in that s 5(2)(b) provides that the defence will not apply where the injury
suffered by the plaintiff arises from circumstances which were entirely separate from those
to which the offender was exposed by reason of being engaged in criminal conduct, and to
which the offender was exposed in common with other persons who were not engaged in
criminal conduct.
83 On appeal from the Western Australian Court of Appeal, which allowed an appeal by the
defendant and entered a verdict in his favour: Miller v Miller (2009) 54 MVR 367.
84 Miller v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446, 453 [9] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel
and Bell JJ).
85 Such an observation is significant because if the defence was to come before a future High
Court, it would not be bound by the decision in Miller v Miller. This does not, however,
undermine the utility of this critical examination because lower courts are bound to apply all
considered obiter dicta of the High Court: see Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty
Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89, 150–1 [134], 159 [158]. Lower courts have therefore applied the
obiter dicta in Captain v Wosomo [2018] 1 Qd R 222; Quine v Keerasawat (2014) 87 SR
(WA) 17; Character Design Pty Ltd v Kohlen [No 2] [2013] WASC 340 (6 September 2013).
Furthermore, the next time the High Court considers the defence it will likely consider the
approach in Miller v Miller as a viable conception.
86 Miller v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446, 454 [15].
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course, or as a result, of that unlawful conduct?... It will be by reference to the
relevant statute, and identification of its purposes, that any incongruity, contrariety
or lack of coherence denying the existence of a duty of care will be found.87
As such, in Miller v Miller the High Court followed the approach it had
previously taken in the context of ‘unilateral illegality’ in Henwood v
Municipal Tramways Trust (SA),88 holding that the illegality defence will
prevent a duty of care in a negligence claim from arising if erecting that duty
would stultify the purpose of the statute governing the plaintiff’s criminal
conduct.89 The ensuing test therefore involves two elements: firstly
ascertaining the purpose of the statute that the plaintiff has contravened, and
secondly determining whether upholding a duty of care in tort law would
undermine that purpose. It is this test, and its application by the High Court,
that will now be examined.
B A critical examination of Australia’s duty-based
approach
1 The basis of the test
In determining the test to apply when considering a plaintiff’s illegality in tort,
the High Court firstly reasoned that because legal coherence is the ‘central’
rationale for the defence, ‘the principles applied in relation to the tort of
negligence must be congruent with those applied in other areas of the civil law
(most notably contract and trusts)’.90 As such, the court simply took the
illegality test that is applied in contracts and trusts, and placed it in the context
of illegality in torts, stating:
It will be by reference to the relevant statute, and identification of its purposes, that
any incongruity, contrariety or lack of coherence denying the existence of a duty of
care will be found... It is the same as the path that has been taken in relation to
illegality in contract and trusts ...91
The High Court’s justification for doing this is related to the fact that it
assessed Danelle’s illegality as a matter relevant to the duty of care inquiry.
From the outset, it should be noted that it is far from clear as to why a
plaintiff’s illegality ought to be examined through the lens of duty of care. The
High Court provides no explanation to this effect. Yet, in choosing to focus on
the concept of duty the court was conscious of the principles espoused in
previously decided cases, such as Sullivan v Moody,92 which warn against the
imposition of a duty of care in negligence where this would cut across other
common law and statutory responsibilities, or otherwise invite incoherence
87 Ibid 454–5 [16], 473 [74].
88 (1938) 60 CLR 438. As a result, this leading High Court judgment appears to have
obliterated the distinction between unilateral and joint illegality for the purpose of the
defence in the general law of torts.
89 Miller v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446, 481–2 [101].
90 Ibid.
91 As was said by the majority: ibid 473 [74].
92 (2001) 207 CLR 562, 581. See also Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; CAL
(No 14) Pty Ltd v Motor Accidents Insurance Board (2009) 239 CLR 390; Equuscorp Pty
Ltd v Haxton (2012) 246 CLR 498; Hunter and New England Local Health District v
McKenna (2014) 253 CLR 270.
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between areas of law.93 As a result, the majority held that when the defence of
illegality is raised in tort, it should be assessed with respect to the equivalent
tests used across the laws of obligation, irrespective of the differing values and
policies across each area of law.94
There is, however, a central difficulty with this reasoning. Its effect is to take
the illegality defence from the law of contract,95 with all its distinctive
policies, and place it into the law of tort without any consideration of the core
values and policies of tort. The defence of illegality in contract is justifiably
premised upon the rationale that one should not be able to profit from criminal
actions.96 However, as was argued in Part II, such a rationale plays a very
limited role in the context of tort law due to the fact that damages in tort
generally seek to compensate plaintiffs for their loss.97 Therefore, a defence of
illegality that only narrowly examines the purpose of the statute in question,
without drawing a distinction between illegal profits and justified
compensation for loss associated with personal injury or property damage,
will arbitrarily deny justified compensation and subsequently stultify a central
purpose of tort law.98 Thus, whereas the High Court explicitly deployed the
language of legal coherence when formulating its illegality defence in tort, it
is arguable that the foundations of its reasoning are underpinned by a search
for legal consistency.
2 The test, the reasoning and the outcome
Applying its ‘statutory purpose’ assessment, the court reasoned that had
Danelle not withdrawn from the joint criminal enterprise, the illegality
defence would have applied and she would have been denied compensation
for her tetraplegia. Two complications with this reasoning will now be
considered.
(a) Element 1: Statutory purpose as an act of judicial legislation
At the heart of the High Court’s approach is a search for an implied legislative
intention in a criminal statute to deny a plaintiff who commits such a crime
from being owed a duty of care in the tort of negligence. The complication
93 The High Court explicitly made reference to the decision in Sullivan v Moody: Miller v
Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446, 454 [15]. For a critical analysis of this principle, however, see
John Fleming, ‘Tort in a Contractual Matrix’ (1995) 3 Tort Law Review 12, 24;
Jane Stapleton, ‘Duty of care factors: a selection from the judicial menus’ in Peter Cane and
Jane Stapleton (eds), The Law of Obligations: Essays in Celebration of John Fleming
(Clarendon Press, 1998) 59, 71–2; James Goudkamp, Tort Law Defences (Hart Publishing,
2013) 201–2.
94 Miller v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446, 482 [102].
95 The illegality defence in trusts is also based on that in contract because the underlying policy
for the tests are generally similar: Nelson v Nelson (1995) 184 CLR 538.
96 Weinrib, ‘Illegality as a Tort Law Defence’, above n 5, 40; Francis Rose, ‘Reconsidering
Illegality’ (1996) 10 Journal of Contract Law 271, 274; Sandra Booysen, ‘Contractual
Illegality and Flexibility — A Rose by Any Other Name’ (2015) 32 Journal of Contract Law
170, 174–5. It therefore makes sense that in contract, the test for illegality looks solely to the
purpose of the statute and whether it would prevent a plaintiff making money from a contract
to do such an illegal act.
97 Except in very two limited circumstances, as explained in Part II.
98 See also Weinrib, ‘Illegality as a Tort Law Defence’, above n 5, 40–3.
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with such an inquiry is that criminal statutes are frequently (if not always)
silent on the question of civil liability in tort. Take, for example, the criminal
statute examined in Miller v Miller, which at the relevant time provided:
371A. Special case: Motor vehicles
(1) A person who unlawfully —
(a) uses a motor vehicle; or
(b) takes a motor vehicle for the purposes of using it; or
(c) drives or otherwise assumes control of a motor vehicle,
without the consent of the owner or the person in charge of that motor vehicle, is said
to steal that motor vehicle.99
The legislature’s silence on the question of civil liability suggests that it either
did not have such an issue in mind at the time of drafting, or purposefully
omitted to consider it. Despite this however, the High Court implied a
legislative intent to negate a duty of care. It did so by, firstly, deducing that the
‘purpose of the statute is to deter and punish individuals using a vehicle in
circumstances that often lead to reckless driving’.100 This is clearly the correct
purpose of the criminal law. However, the court then reasoned that it is
implicit within such a purpose that the legislature intended that where a
plaintiff and a defendant are complicit in a crime of illegally using a motor
vehicle, such a plaintiff is to be denied a duty of care by that defendant to drive
safely. As stated by the majority:
The statutory purpose of a law proscribing dangerous or reckless driving is not
consistent with one offender owing a co-offender a duty to take reasonable care...
The inconsistency or incongruity arises regardless of whether reckless or dangerous
driving eventuates. It arises from the recognition that the purpose of the statute is to
deter and punish using a vehicle in circumstances that often lead to reckless and
dangerous driving.101
If we return to the statute extracted above, however, it seems artificial to
reason that the legislature intended for s 371A of the Criminal Code Act
Compilation Act 1913 (WA) to operate in tort law.102 Yet the High Court
replaced the usual tort law principles with the imputed purpose of the criminal
statute, and presumed that the legislature resolved to do this. As has been
identified by numerous authors,103 such reasoning represents an act of judicial
legislation. Indeed, at the commencement of their reasoning, the majority
judges themselves queried the utility of this search for statutory purpose;
concerned that such an exercise would be a smokescreen for judges giving
99 Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) s 371A.
100 Miller v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446, 481–2 [101].
101 Ibid.
102 As was said in J Theobald, The Interpretation of Statutes by the late Sir Peter Benson
Maxwell (4th ed, Sweet and Maxwell, 1905) at 122: ‘It is in the largest degree improbable
that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights, or depart from
the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness’. This
observation was approved of by the High Court in Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 277, 304
(O’Connor J) and has since been more recently applied in McElwaine v Owners — Strata
Plan 75975 (2017) 18 BPR 37,207, 37,208 [2] (Basten JA), 37,220 [66]–[67] (White JA).
103 Erbacher, Negligence and Illegality, above n 26, 128–9; McLachlin, above n 5, 217;
Fleming, The Law of Torts, above n 26, 139.
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‘effect to their own ideas of policy’.104 Nevertheless, the approach ultimately
endorsed by the High Court simply allows judges to stipulate whether or not
a claim is contrary to a criminal statute without having to consider any
relevant policy factors other than the relevant statutory purpose.105
An unfortunate consequence of this reasoning is that the application of the
illegality defence now disturbs the principles and policies of tort. In this
judgment, the High Court reasons that a duty to drive with reasonable care
between two co-offenders is inconsistent with the purpose of the statute, as
upholding such a duty would not punish or deter Danelle from illegally using
the stolen vehicle.106 As a result, the criminal law’s purpose to deter and
punish offenders is effectively imported into the law of tort and any
recognition of the principles of tort law — that it is a body of law which aims
to compensate plaintiffs where they have suffered loss due to the fault of a
defendant,107 or to do corrective justice between the parties,108 or to place
justified moral responsibility upon defendants when their actions fall below
the standard expected of society109 — are all but forgotten. Thus, Australia’s
application of the illegality defence undermines the elemental goals of tort
law.
(b) Element 2: An artificial denial of the duty of care
In Miller v Miller the High Court held that a plaintiff’s illegality is not to be
considered a ‘traditional defence’ but rather a ‘salient feature’110 central in
determining whether the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty of care.111 The
central problem with this conception is that it presumes that illegality is only
relevant at the duty of care stage. As previously stated, the court gave no
reasons for why a plaintiff’s illegality should be solely understood through the
lens of a duty of care nor did it articulate the advantages of such an approach.
In the context of Miller v Miller, there was an established duty that could
104 Miller v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446, 459–60 [29] citing Sovar v Henry Lane Pty Ltd (1967)
116 CLR 397, 405.
105 Such as the seriousness of the plaintiff’s illegality, the relative culpability of the plaintiff
compared to that of the defendant, whether it would be proportionate to deny compensation,
or the policy that a duty of care is owed to all persons, not those who have not committed
illegal actions (we are not in a court of equity). As we will see below, all of these factors are
relevant to the UK’s illegality defence.
106 Miller v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446, 481–2 [101].
107 See Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility (Princeton
University Press, 1970) 212–21; Martin Stone, ‘On the Idea of Private Law’ (1996) 9
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 235, 249. See also generally Peter Cane, The
Anatomy of Tort Law (Hart Publishing, 1997) ch 1; Glanville Williams, ‘The Aims of the
Law of Tort’ (1951) 4 Current Legal Problems 137.
108 See Ernest Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Harvard University Press, 1995) 4–5;
Allan Beever, Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (Hart Publishing, 2007) 3–19;
Jules Coleman, The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal
Theory (Oxford University Press, 2001) 5–6.
109 See Peter Cane, ‘Retribution, Proportionality and Moral Luck in Tort Law’ in Peter Cane and
Jane Stapleton (eds), The Law of Obligations: Essays in Celebration of John Fleming
(Clarendon Press, 1998) 141, 148; Izhak Englard, The Philosophy of Tort Law (Dartmouth
Publishing, 1993) 8–10.
110 Albeit an overriding one.
111 Miller v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446, 454 [13].
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have readily applied: the duty owed by a driver to a passenger to drive with
reasonable care.112 Nevertheless, the court found that to uphold such a duty in
the circumstances of the case would be incongruous with the purpose of
s 307A of the Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA). A major
deficiency in this conclusion, however, is that if Maurin was deemed to owe
a duty of care to Danelle to drive safely, it would have no bearing on the
relevant statutory purpose. The authorities could still use the criminal law to
find Danelle guilty of the offence proscribed by s 371A, and thus achieve the
purposes of punishment and deterrence. Furthermore, upholding such a duty
would arguably enhance the purpose of the statute, as it would require the
defendant to drive with reasonable care and therefore promote road safety
(albeit from within a stolen vehicle).113 Thus, the High Court’s reasoning was
seemingly artificial in the sense that it established inconsistency between tort
law and the criminal law even though upholding such a duty would likely
enhance the purpose of the statute. Furthermore, it is arguable that in most
cases there will be no incongruity between criminal law and tort law because
a duty of care in tort law will rarely undermine the authorities’ ability to
separately prosecute a plaintiff in order to achieve a criminal statute’s purpose.
It is our contention that the High Court’s duty-based analysis is therefore
misguided, as it is devoid of an understanding that the simultaneous operation
of two areas of law to achieve multiple and distinct purposes is demonstrative
of a coherent legal system.
C Application of the analytical framework to the
duty-based approach
With the above critical examination in mind, this section will now apply the
analytical legal coherence framework, developed in Part II, to Australia’s
conception of the illegality defence:
(i) The test adopted undertakes a form of doctrinal transplantation by
ensuring that the formulations of the illegality defence are identical
across contract law, the law of trusts and tort law. In adopting an
indistinguishable test that solely focuses upon the statute that the
plaintiff has infringed, the analysis that informs whether the defence
should be applied inadequately values the distinctive principles and
policies of each area of the common law.
(ii) The primary focus of the test on ascertaining the purpose of the
relevant criminal statute means that tort laws’ longstanding principles
and policies are given insufficient consideration.
(iii) The application of the defence is arguably irrational and
unreasonable. Its unreasonability stems from the fact that it
disingenuously holds that Parliament intended for a criminal statute
to alter the general principles of tort law. It then uses this assumption
to come to the somewhat illogical conclusion that there will be an
inconsistency between a duty of care in tort law and the criminal law.
112 See Imbree v McNeilly (2008) 236 CLR 510.
113 If we follow the court’s line of reasoning, it can also be said that if defendant drivers do not
owe a duty of care to their criminal confederate passengers, they are more likely to act
recklessly and endanger the public. This therefore undermines the purpose of the statute.
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(iv) The above analysis demonstrates that Australia’s conception of the
illegality defence is seemingly based on legal consistency, rather than
legal coherence. Not only is the formulation of the illegality defence
adopted such that it is consistent with the other laws of obligations,
but the application of the defence also replaces goals of tort law with
the purpose of the criminal statute.
While the simplicity of the Australian conception of the illegality defence
appears, at first glance, to inject clarity into a historically chaotic principle of
law, such simplicity elides a nuanced distinction between legal consistency
and legal coherence. As a result, it is our contention that Australia’s illegality
defence in tort may risk undermining the very purpose for which it was
established.
IV The illegality defence in Canada and the UK: A
comparative analysis
In light of the foregoing deficiencies in the Australian formulation of the
illegality defence, this Part will examine the alternative conceptions of the
defence adopted by: (A) the Canadian Supreme Court in Hall v Hebert,114 and
(B) the UKSC in Patel v Mirza.115 As stated in Part I, in contrast to the
position articulated in Miller v Miller, the respective approaches to the
illegality defence adopted within these comparable common law jurisdictions
have received significant scholarly support. As such, this Part will analyse the
reasoning and approach articulated in the leading decisions of Canada and the
UK.
A The Canadian approach
1 The facts and decision of Hall v Hebert
In July 1986, the defendant Hebert, and the plaintiff Hall, drove home from a
party. Hebert drove the car, given that Hall had consumed approximately eight
beers. During the drive home, however, the pair stopped halfway to share a
further six beers. At 3 am, they continued driving until they hit a gravel road
that was so rough that the car keys fell out of the ignition. They could not find
the keys, so they decided to start the car via a ‘rolling start’ down a hill. Hall
asked if he could drive, to which Hebert replied ‘sure ok’. The roll start was
attempted and Hall lost control. The car left the road, fell down a sheer slope
and Hall suffered significant head injuries. Hall later sued Hebert, alleging that
he was negligent in giving Hall permission to drive the car. Counsel for Hebert
alleged that as Hall was driving while intoxicated, he was acting illegally and
therefore the illegality defence should apply to negate his claim.
A majority in the Canadian Supreme Court found that Hall was
contributorily negligent, and as a result liability was to be apportioned
between the parties. However, the majority further held that the fact that Hall
was acting illegally at the time the tort was committed should not prevent him
from recovering compensation. Providing the leading judgment, McLachlin J
propounded:
114 [1993] 2 SR 159.
115 [2017] AC 467.
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[The defence] is justified where allowing the plaintiff’s claim would introduce
inconsistency into the fabric of the law, whether by permitting the plaintiff to profit
from an illegal or wrongful act, or to evade a penalty prescribed by criminal law. Its
use is not justified where the plaintiff’s claim is merely for compensation for
personal injuries sustained as a consequence of the negligence of the defendant.116
Thus, in its landmark decision the Canadian Supreme Court adopted a
rule-based approach to the illegality defence, which holds that except in the
above two circumstances,117 the illegality defence in tort should not operate as
a bar to an award of compensation.118 It is this test, and the court’s justification
of it, that will now be critically examined.
2 A critical examination of the rule-based approach
The Canadian approach conceptualises illegality as a traditional defence,
frustrating an otherwise complete cause of action, as opposed to a defence that
negates the duty of care element in negligence. At the time Hall v Hebert was
decided, however, the Canadian Supreme Court was yet to formulate a test for
the illegality defence in the specific context of negligence.119 As such, it had
to decide the way in which the defence should be framed and ‘in what
circumstances and under what doctrinal rubric courts may prevent a plaintiff
from recovering compensation in tort’120 on the grounds of illegality. To aid
in this task, the court considered various Australian,121 English,122 and
American123 precedents, which at the time were relatively undeveloped.
Notably, when considering whether to adopt the duty-based approach,
McLachlin J labelled it a ‘draconian power’124 that undermines the entire
foundation of the tort of negligence itself:
Donoghue v Stevenson, the source of our modern law of negligence and of the
concept of duty upon which is it founded, requires that a person exercise reasonable
care toward all his or her neighbours. It does not say that the duty is owed only to
116 Hall v Hebert [1993] 2 SCR 159, 179–80 (McLachlin J with whom La Forest,
L’Heureux-Dubé and Iacobucci JJ agreed).
117 The first situation has been described as a ‘shifting sanction action’: see James Goudkamp,
‘Can Tort Law be Used to Deflect the Impact of Criminal Sanctions? The Role of the
Illegality Defence’ (2006) 14 Torts Law Journal 20, 28. It occurs when a plaintiff attempts
to use tort law to deflect the impact of a sanction imposed on her by the criminal law. As an
example of the second situation, the illegality defence will bar a plaintiff from receiving
exemplary damages because they are not compensatory in nature, and from recovering lost
wages when the plaintiff’s employment income derives from criminal activity: see
McLachlin, above n 5, 213.
118 It must be understood that the reference to ‘profit’ is limited: a plaintiff will only be said to
profit where they seek exemplary damages or damages for loss of income where that income
was based on profiting from criminal actions. As said by McLachlin J, ‘Compensation for
something other than wrongdoing, such as for personal injury, would not amount to profit in
this sense’: Hall v Hebert [1993] 2 SCR 159, 172.
119 Ibid 171–2.
120 Ibid 169.
121 McLachlin J cited Smith v Jenkins (1970) 119 CLR 397, Gala v Preston (1991) 172 CLR
243: ibid 171.
122 McLachlin J cited Lane v Holloway [1968] 1 QB 379, Pitts v Hunt [1991] 1 QB 24, Burns v
Edman [1970] 2 QB 541: ibid 171, 175.
123 McLachlin J cited Katco v Briney, 183 NW 2d 657 (Iowa, 1971), Harper v Grasser 150 P
1175 (Wash, 1915): ibid 175–6.
124 Hall v Hebert [1993] 2 SCR 159, 169–70.
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neighbours who have acted morally and legally. Tort, unlike equity which requires
that the plaintiff come with clean hands, does not require a plaintiff to have a certain
moral character in order to bring an action before the court. The duty of care is owed
to all persons who may reasonably be foreseen to be injured by the negligent
conduct.125
Following this statement, McLachlin J went on to reason that the illegality
defence in tort must take into account tort law’s unique principles and policies,
and must be conceptualised as a traditional defence that, when made out,
negates the cause of action.126
The benefit of this formulation, as has been demonstrated by numerous
authors,127 is that by constructing an illegality defence in tort that takes into
account different considerations from those contemplated in contract or equity,
the defence is better attuned to those principles and policies of tort law that
exist to achieve corrective justice between the parties,128 while also avoiding
legally incoherent outcomes. At the heart of this rule-based approach are the
two identified circumstances (or ‘exceptions’) in which the defence of
illegality must operate.129 Importantly, however, cases falling within these
exceptions are distinguished from a plaintiff merely seeking compensatory
damages. As explained by McLachlin J, the defence must operate to exempt
liability in these exceptional cases because doing otherwise would enable tort
law to undermine the criminal law and create incoherence in the law.130
Therefore, the Canadian Supreme Court specifically identified the factual
matrices in which incoherence will arise between tort law and the criminal
law, and clearly formulated a rule-based defence that guards against these
circumstances.131 By restricting the operation of the defence in this way, the
court was mindful to respect the principle that tort law must achieve corrective
justice between the parties; the illegality defence is not applicable simply
where a plaintiff, although engaged in illegal conduct, merely seeks to be
compensated for their loss due to a defendant’s tort. Thus, in formulating an
illegality defence that is specific to tort law, the defence is nuanced and
satisfactorily aligns with its underlying rationale: to preserve coherence, as
opposed to mere consistency, in the law.132
125 Ibid 182.
126 Ibid.
127 Weinrib, ‘Illegality as a Tort Law Defence’, above n 5, 50–1; McLachlin, above n 5, 215;
Goudkamp, ‘Self Defence and Illegality under the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)’, above
n 12, 68–9.
128 Beverley McLachlin, writing extra-judicially, has identified this: see McLachlin, above n 5,
220–2.
129 See above n 116.
130 McLachlin J explained that to allow recovery in these cases would put the courts in the
position of saying that the same conduct is both legal, in the sense of being capable of
rectification by the court, and illegal: see Hall v Hebert [1993] 2 SCR 159, 176
(McLachlin J).
131 Ernest Weinrib predicted this when he outlined the conception of the defence in his article,
‘Illegality as a Tort Law Defence’, above n 5, 50–1.
132 Moreover, in recognising that a plaintiff’s illegality is a concern that is independent from the
duty of care analysis, a court must firstly hold that a defendant has been negligent before the
illegality defence will apply. Then, if it is necessary for the defence to apply, a court will find
that the defendant’s responsibility is only discharged because of a concern that the law will
otherwise become incoherent: Hall v Hebert [1993] 2 SCR 159, 181–2. Thus, tort law’s
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Nevertheless, it is the rule-based nature of this approach, largely premised
upon curtailing judicial discretion, which constitutes a major shortcoming in
the Canadian approach. As has already been discussed in the analysis of legal
coherence in Part II, each of the various principles and policies of the common
law must be considered when determining whether the illegality defence
should be applied. This is because they are relevant to whether the outcome
in tort will be coherent with the broader legal system.133 However, the
Canadian conception only identifies two circumstances in which
compensation in tort law will conflict with the criminal law. As a result, no
attention is paid is to the outcomes that would occur in the other branches of
the law of obligations, such as contract law or unjust enrichment. It is
therefore possible that the defence will not be applied where an outcome in
tort is incoherent with another branch of the law of obligations.134
3 Application of the analytical framework to the rule-based
approach
(i) The Canadian defence is premised on applying in two circumstances
where it has been identified that an outcome in tort would be
incoherent with the criminal law. This means that the underlying
principles and policies of other areas of law, and the possibility that
an outcome in tort could conflict with another branch within the law
of obligations, are ignored. Thus, the analysis that informs whether
the defence should be applied does not value the distinctive policies
of each area of the common law, other than those of tort and criminal
law.
(iii) The Canadian Supreme Court devised an illegality defence that is
specifically unique to the law of torts. Thus, tort law principles — in
particular the foundational concept of duty in negligence as laid out
in Donoghue v Stevenson135 — are given adequate weight.
(iii) The defence admits of two exceptions, which are premised upon a
sophisticated understanding of the difference between a legally
incoherent outcome and allowing a plaintiff to be compensated for
loss. For this reason, its application is particularly intelligible.
longstanding principle of publicly labelling defendants as negligent where they are at fault
is still upheld, while the application of the defence reasonably and intelligibly demonstrates
to society that although the defendant has committed a civil wrong responsibility must be
absolved to preserve coherence within the legal system.
133 See Part II.
134 Take a hypothetical example where the principles of tort and contract intersect: A suffers
consequential economic loss when B negligently weighs and sells to A 0.1 g of
methamphetamine for personal use, believing it to be 1 g. A will not be able to sue in
contract, given the principle that a court will not enforce a contract for illegal services. If
however, A chooses to sue in tort, under the Canadian approach the illegality defence will
not apply, as the fact scenario does not fit into any of the two exceptions: A is not profiting
from her actions, nor is she trying to deflect the impact of a criminal sanction. Thus, a court
will be restricted from taking into account the fact that contract law prevents the
enforcement of such a contract and therefore A’s successful outcome in tort may lead to
incoherence.
135 [1932] UKHL 100.
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(iv) The rule-based nature of the defence leaves limited discretion for
courts or individual judges to unjustifiably strip plaintiffs of their
private rights in tort. Such a denial of discretion implicitly recognises
that the creation of legal coherence is sometimes outweighed by the
need to prevent judges from denying plaintiffs otherwise justified
compensation.136
In sum, the rule-based Canadian approach means that when the illegality
defence applies, it is certain to create legal coherence between criminal law
and tort law. Furthermore, given that it is devised to apply in tort specifically,
it is better able to value the principles and policies of tort and therefore ensure
that this body of law is legally coherent. Although it is limited due to the fact
that its consideration of legal coherence does not extend to the entirety of the
law of obligations, it is arguable that the Canadian conception is a
sophisticated and nuanced defence.
B The UK approach
1 The facts and decision of Patel v Mirza
Patel (the plaintiff) transferred £620,000 to Mirza (the defendant), pursuant to
an agreement that Mirza would use the money to bet on the movement of
shares, on the basis of insider information that he would receive from a certain
contact. However, Mirza did not end up receiving the insider information and
the betting did not take place. When Patel asked for the funds to be returned,
Mirza refused. As a result, Patel brought a claim in unjust enrichment, seeking
recovery of the funds. Counsel for Mirza argued that as the agreement
between the parties amounted to a conspiracy to commit an offence of insider
dealing,137 the illegality defence applied.
A majority in the UKSC held that while the illegality defence applied in
contract law to prevent Patel from reclaiming his funds, it did not apply in the
law of unjust enrichment, and thus Patel’s claim was upheld. On behalf of the
majority, Lord Toulson JSC held that legal coherence is the underlying
rational for the illegality defence138 and propounded that when applying the
defence, it is necessary to:
a) consider the underlying purpose of the prohibition which has been
transgressed and whether that purpose will be enhanced by denial of
the claim;
b) consider any other relevant public policy on which the denial of the
claim may have an impact and;
c) consider whether denial of the claim would be a proportionate
response to the illegality, bearing in mind that punishment is a matter
for the criminal courts.139
Lord Toulson JSC therefore established a three-step test, which is said to
structure the discretion given to courts in assessing whether a plaintiff’s
136 Hall v Hebert [1993] 2 SCR 159, 175–6.
137 See the Criminal Justice Act 1993 (UK) s 52.
138 Although he instead used the words ‘harmful to the integrity of the legal system’: Patel v
Mirza [2017] AC 467, 504 [120] (Lord Toulson JSC, with whom Baroness Hale DPSC,
Lord Kerr, Lord Wilson and Lord Hodge JJSC agreed).
139 Ibid 504–5 [120].
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illegality should preclude an award of compensation.140 It has been held that
this discretionary test applies across all four branches of the law of
obligations,141 and therefore it is essential that the test be critically examined
in order to scrutinise its operation in the context of tort law.
2 A critical examination of the discretionary-based approach
What characterises the UK’s defence is that it is explicitly premised upon
giving judges a broad discretion to consider a wide variety of policy factors
relevant to whether the illegality defence should be applied.142 As proponents
of the discretionary approach have argued,143 this is the test’s primary
advantage, as it enables a court to take into account all of the factors,
including the distinctive policies and principles of each area of law, that
appear relevant in determining whether a particular award of compensation in
tort will be legally coherent.144
By way of demonstration, when the majority applied this test to the facts of
the case, it firstly took into account the policy underlying the criminal statute,
stating that the ‘relevance of taking into account the purpose of the relevant
prohibition is self-evident’.145 Rather than concentrating solely on this matter,
however, the majority proceeded to take into account other relevant policy
factors, including the policy which made the contract between Patel and Mirza
illegal,146 the policy of unjust enrichment law,147 and the overall integrity and
harmony of the law.148 It then considered whether Patel’s claim in unjust
enrichment would stultify any of these purposes.149 Following this
140 However, Lord Toulson JSC also acknowledged that within this framework an unlimited
number of factors may be relevant, including ‘the seriousness of the conduct ... and whether
it was intentional or whether there was a marked disparity in the parties’ respective conduct’:
ibid 501 [507].
141 See Tchenguiz v Grant Thornton UK LLP [2016] EWHC 3727 (Comm); McHugh v
Okai-Koi [2017] EWHC 710 (QB); Singularis Holdings Ltd v Daiwa Capital Markets
Europe Ltd [2017] EWHC 257 (Ch). See also James Goudkamp, ‘Does Patel v Mirza Apply
in Tort?’ (2017) (July/August) Personal Injury Law Journal 1.
142 Lord Toulson JSC held that when assessing whether the defence should apply, many factors
may be relevant and that setting a prescriptive or definitive list would be unhelpful given the
infinite possible variety of cases: Patel v Mirza [2017] AC 467, 501 [107].
143 See Burrows, above n 4, 61, 67; Ernest Lim, ‘Tensions in Private Law Judicial
Decision-Making: A Case Study on the Illegality Defence’ (2016) 4 Journal of Business Law
325, 328–9; Lord Grabiner QC, ‘Illegality and Restitution Explained by the Supreme Court’
(Speech delivered at the Distinguished Law Lecture, Queens’ College, Cambridge, 19
October 2016) 9–10; Paul Davies, ‘The Illegality Defence and Public Policy’ (2009) 125
Law Quarterly Review 556, 560; Nicholas Strauss, ‘Ex Turpi Causa Oritur Actio?’ (2016)
132 Law Quarterly Review 236, 265.
144 Burrows asserts that this is superior to a rule-based approach because, ‘illegality in the law
of obligations involves so many variables that the normal formulation of rules is
problematic’: see Burrows, above n 4, 56.
145 Patel v Mirza [2017] AC 467, 503 [115]
146 Ibid 503 [115].
147 Ibid 501 [108].
148 Ibid.
149 Lord Toulson held that (ibid 505 [121]):
A claimant, such as Mr Patel, who satisfies the ordinary requirements of a claim for
unjust enrichment, should not be debarred from enforcing his claim by reason only of the
fact that the money which he seeks to recover was paid for an unlawful purpose. There
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consideration of the pertinent ‘range of factors’, the majority ultimately
concluded that there was no logical basis requiring Patel to forfeit his funds,
as such a result would otherwise unreasonably limit the application of unjust
enrichment.150 This reasoning reveals that, in taking into account the purposes
of contract, unjust enrichment and criminal law, the UKSC was able to arrive
at the intelligible and reasonable conclusion that no incoherence would arise
in the circumstances of this case. Thus, the UK discretionary approach is
advantageous in the sense that it has the capacity to promote a sophisticated
level of legal coherence.
Nevertheless, such extensive judicial discretion has also attracted scholarly
criticism151 on the basis that it allows judges to lose sight of the centrality of
legal coherence as the most justifiable reason for defeating legal rights on
account of a plaintiff’s illegality. The proportionality limb of the test reflects
this criticism. Lord Toulson JSC held in Patel v Mirza that it is central to
consider whether the denial of the claim would be a proportionate response to
the illegality, because ‘it enables the court to avoid inflicting loss on the
claimant disproportionate to the measure of his badness’.152 His Lordship then
reasoned that an unlimited number of factors are relevant to this limb.153
An illegality defence that is premised upon legal coherence, yet requires a
court to also consider whether the outcome is proportionate to the illegality in
question, is arguably flawed. This is because, as identified by Erbacher,154
proportionality is irrelevant to assessing whether an outcome will undermine
legal coherence. As was explained in Part II, the illegality defence should not
be applied to punish plaintiffs for their criminal actions, as they will have
already been punished, or have the capacity to be punished in a justified and
reasonable manner, by the criminal law.155 It follows that irrespective of how
serious the illegality is, if a plaintiff is simply seeking compensation for their
loss due to a defendant’s negligence, this will never have an adverse effect on
the application of the criminal law and, for this reason, the illegality defence
may be rare cases where for some particular reason the enforcement of such a claim
might be regarded as undermining the integrity of the justice system, but there are no
such circumstances in this case.
150 Ibid 503–4 [115]–[119].
151 See James Goudkamp, ‘The End of an Era? Illegality in Private Law in the Supreme Court’
(2017) 133 Law Quarterly Review 14, 17–18; Law and Ong, above n 48, 892; Graham
Virgo, ‘Patel v Mirza: one step forward and two steps back’ (2016) 22 Trusts & Trustees
1090, 1094; Erbacher, ‘Another Misstep in Negligence and Illegality’, above n 2, 1061,
1080, 1084; Erbacher, Negligence and Illegality, above n 26, 60. Critics have argued that the
UK approach is unfavourable because it creates uncertainty in the law. Since the test requires
a court to weigh incommensurable factors, it is extremely difficult for a court to come to a
rational decision that can be followed by later courts or predicted by legal advisers.
152 Patel v Mirza [2017] AC 467, 545 [262] (Lord Sumption JSC referring to
Lord Toulson JSC’s reasoning).
153 Including ‘the seriousness of the conduct ... and whether it was intentional or whether there
was a marked disparity in the parties’ respective conduct’: ibid 501 [107]
(Lord Toulson JSC).
154 Erbacher, ‘Another Misstep in Negligence and Illegality’, above n 2, 1073–4.
155 And if they have not, tort law is an inappropriate mechanism to do punishment. It is for the
realm of criminal law to do this: McLachlin, above n 5, 212; Goudkamp, ‘Self Defence and
Illegality under the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)’, above n 12, 67–8; Ford, above n 38,
185; Virgo, above n 38, 188; Gibson, above n 38, 91.
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should never apply in these circumstances156 As such, the proportionality limb
of the defence allows a court to take into account many factors that are
irrelevant to legal coherence, and in the words of Lord Sumption JSC in the
minority, ‘leave a great deal to a judge’s visceral reaction to particular
facts’.157
3 Application of the analytical framework to the
discretionary-based approach
(i) The UK’s illegality defence is identical across all four branches of
the law of obligations.158 However, because it is premised upon wide
judicial discretion, the analysis that informs whether the defence
should apply is able to properly value the distinctive principles and
policies that underpin each area of the common law.
(ii) The test enables the principles and policies of tort law to be taken
into account. However, the extent of the weight that they are given
will vary greatly depending upon each individual judge or court.
Thus, it is uncertain whether tort law’s foundational principles will
be properly considered in each decision.
(iii) The application of the defence has the capacity to produce reasonable
and intelligible outcomes, as was demonstrated in Patel v Mirza.
However, given that proportionality is a central consideration, it is
just as likely that the application of the defence will be arbitrary and
unreasonable on the basis that proportionality is irrelevant to the
rationale of legal coherence.
(iv) While discretionary, the approach appears to favour rigid legal
consistency because its proportionality limb dominantly persuades
courts to give effect to the criminal law’s purpose. When a plaintiff
has committed a very serious offence, UK courts will likely reason
that as the criminality of the offence is proportionate to the injury
suffered, the illegality defence should be applied. Thus, the plaintiff
will be punished a second time, even if they have already been (or
could in the future be) subjected to punishment for contravening the
criminal law. The result is that tort law simply mirrors the criminal
law’s purpose to punish and therefore achieves flawed legal
consistency.
In sum, the UK’s illegality defence can be praised for its ability to take into
account the distinctive purposes and principles of each area of law.
Nevertheless, the proportionality limb of the discretionary approach
156 Conversely, irrespective of how minor the illegality is, if the plaintiff is seeking to deflect a
sanction imposed by the criminal law, by using tort law, then the illegality defence must be
applied to achieve legal coherence.
157 Patel v Mirza [2017] AC 467, 546 [263] (Lord Sumption JSC with whom Lord Clarke JSC
agreed).
158 Although see Henderson v Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust [2018] 3
WLR 1651, 1673 where the English Court of Appeal suggested that a different formulation
to that adopted in Patel v Mirza may apply in some types of tort cases.
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unacceptably allows individual judges to contemplate a number of irrelevant
factors that may operate to strip plaintiffs of otherwise justified
compensation.159
C Preliminary conclusion
This article has now outlined and critically evaluated the three distinctive
conceptions of the illegality defence used by Australia, Canada and the UK.
By deploying the analytical legal coherence framework, we can draw the
following preliminary conclusion:
1. The duty-based illegality defence adopted in Australia
problematically promotes legal consistency, in place of coherence.
2. The rule-based illegality defence adopted in Canada promotes
sophisticated and nuanced reasoning, which aims to preserve legal
coherence, with the exception that it may fail to account for any
incoherence that arises when the law of torts comes into conflict with
another law of obligation (rather than the criminal law).
3. The discretionary-based illegality defence adopted in the UK has the
capacity to produce an even greater level of legal coherence.
However, its overarching proportionality limb is unsatisfactory, as it
means the defence can be used to unjustifiably punish plaintiffs a
second time. While it is accepted that the alternative rule-based
approach may fail to apply in justified circumstances, a rule-based
test is more sophisticated than open-ended discretion because when
the defence applies, it is certain to create legal coherence.160
Based on these preliminary findings, it is desirable for Australia to question its
duty-based approach and consider reconceptualising the illegality defence in
light of the formulation adopted by the Canadian Supreme Court in Hall v
Hebert.
V A case study investigation
Given that Australia’s illegality defence has been the subject of little scrutiny,
this final Part will examine the likely outcome rendered by the Miller v Miller
defence in response to the facts of a previously decided case. It will then
briefly compare this hypothesised result to the likely outcomes rendered by the
rule-based and discretionary-based approaches.
159 This was recognised by Lord Sumption JSC in dissent: Patel v Mirza [2017] AC 467, 545
[262].
160 For further evidence of this conclusion, see the Canadian cases that have since applied
Hall v Hebert: Blackwater v Plint [2005] 3 SCR 3; Ingles v Tutkaluk Construction Ltd
[2000] 1 SCR 298; Stewart v Pettie [1995] 1 SCR 131; British Columbia Ltd v Canada
[1993] 3 SCR 804. See especially British Columbia v Zastowny [2008] 1 SCR 27. As was
said by McLachlin J when considering whether such a discretionary approach should be
adopted (Hall v Hebert [1993] 2 SCR 159, 171):
I fear that unless placed upon a firm doctrinal foundation and made subject to clear limits,
this general power to invalidate actions on grounds of public policy might prove more
problematic than has the troubled doctrine of ex turpi causa non oritur action. We would
be trading one label for another without coming to grips with the fundamental problem.
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A Joyce v O’Brien
The facts used for the first case study analysis are those of Joyce v O’Brien;161
a UK case decided before the test for illegality was clarified in Patel v Mirza.
The claimant in this case, Joyce, was the nephew of the defendant, O’Brien,
and they had decided to steal some ladders from a building site. The parties
drove to the site in Obrien’s van. Joyce got out, stole the ladders, and placed
them in the rear of the van. Due to their length, the ladders protruded from the
van and its back doors had to be left open. As such, Joyce decided to stay in
the back of the van and hold the ladders in place. As O’Brien drove off, he
drove around a corner at excessive speed and Joyce was consequently thrown
out of the van and suffered serious head injuries, including brain damage.
Joyce and O’Brien were later charged and convicted of larceny.162 Afterwards,
Joyce sued O’Brien in negligence, claiming compensation for his injuries.
Counsel for O’Brien argued, however,163 that since the parties had engaged in
a joint criminal enterprise to commit larceny, the illegality defence should
apply to exempt their liability in negligence.
1 The outcome according to the Australian duty-based approach
If Joyce were to bring his claim in NSW, the illegality defence outlined in s 54
of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) would not apply, as O’Brien’s negligent
conduct constituted an offence. That is, he was engaged in a joint criminal
enterprise to commit the offence of larceny under s 117 of the Crimes Act 1900
(NSW) (‘CA’) at the time the tort occurred.164 Therefore, a court would need
to turn to the common law in considering whether the illegality defence should
operate as a bar to compensation.
Pursuant to the approach endorsed in Miller v Miller, the court should first
ascertain the purpose of s 117 of the CA in order to determine whether it would
be incongruous with this purpose for a court to uphold a duty of care in the
law of negligence.165 Section 117 states: ‘Whosoever commits larceny, or any
felony by this Act made punishable like larceny, shall, except in the cases
hereinafter otherwise provided for, be liable to penal servitude for five years.’
However, since neither the CA nor its explanatory memorandum provide a
definition of the word ‘larceny’, the purpose of this section can only be
identified by considering the common law definition of larceny. As was
established by the High Court in Ilich v The Queen:
At common law, larceny is committed by a person who, without the consent of the
owner, fraudulently and without a claim of right made in good faith, takes and
161 [2014] 1 WLR 70.
162 See the Theft Act 1968 (UK) ss 1, 7.
163 The second defendant was the relevant insurance company who would be liable for the
payment of compensation.
164 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 54(2). See also the relevant discussion of the scope of this
provision in Part I of this article at above n 8.
165 The relevant duty of care would be the established duty that a driver owes to their passenger
to drive with reasonable care: Imbree v McNeilly (2008) 236 CLR 510.
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carries away anything capable of being stolen with intent, at the time of such taking,
permanently to deprive the owner thereof ...166
It follows from this definition that the purpose of s 117 is to protect and uphold
the right to exclusive possession, by punishing and deterring those who
dishonestly acquire property.167 If we employ the reasoning adopted in
Miller v Miller, it is likely that erecting a duty of care in tort law to drive with
reasonable care would undermine this purpose in circumstances where such
driving enabled the plaintiff to steal the ladders. This is because the duty of
care is so inextricably linked to the crime that to uphold it would stultify the
legislature’s intention to punish and deter those who commit larceny.168 Thus,
the expected outcome of the Australian duty-based approach will be that the
defence applies to deny Joyce a duty of care and, consequently, any
compensation for his injuries.
There are two noteworthy observations that can be made following this
brief case study. The first is that the finding of inconsistency between the
criminal law, on the one hand, and the established duty to drive with
reasonable care, on the other, is disingenuous. Since Joyce and O’Brien were
convicted of the offence of larceny, they had already been punished by the
criminal law. Therefore, to reason that upholding a duty of care would be
inconsistent with the purpose of s 117 of the CA is artificial,169 in the sense
that such a duty would not undermine the criminal penalties already imposed
on the parties. Even if Joyce were to be compensated for his injuries in tort,
his criminal sentence would not be altered and, for this reason, his remedy in
tort would have no bearing on the criminal law’s purpose.170 The reasoning
that denies Joyce a duty of care is founded upon a rigid understanding of
166 Ilich v The Queen (1987) 162 CLR 110, 123 (Wilson and Dawson JJ).
167 See, eg, Edward Griew, ‘Dishonesty: The Objections to Feely and Ghosh’ [1985] Criminal
Law Review 341, 342–4; Andrew Simester and Robert Sullivan, ‘On the Nature and
Rationale of Property Offences’ in R Duff and Stuart Green (eds), Defining Crimes: Essays
on the Special Part of the Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2005) 169, 173–83;
George Fletcher, ‘The Metamorphosis of Larceny’ (1976) 89 Harvard Law Review 469,
472–4. See generally David Ormerod and David Williams, Smith’s Law of Theft (Oxford
University Press, 9th ed, 2007) ch 1.
168 This absurd outcome is analogous to the outcome in Miller v Miller, where it was held that
a duty to drive with reasonable care should not be upheld to a passenger as it would be
inconsistent with the legislature’s purpose to punish and deter dangerous driving: Miller v
Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446, 481–2 [101].
169 What further contributes to this artificiality is that s 117 is totally reliant on the common
law’s interpretation of the word ‘larceny’, as no definition is provided in the Crimes
Act 1900 (NSW). Thus, to reason that the legislature intended for the purpose of this offence
to negate a duty of care in negligence, means that the common law must also have such an
intention. The problem with such a conclusion is that when larceny was created as an offence
by the common law, the modern tort of negligence (as formulated by the English courts) was
not yet recognised in Australia — Australia did not endorse the modern approach to
negligence until the High Court decision in 1933 in Australian Knitting Mills Ltd v Grant
(1933) 50 CLR 387. Furthermore, even if it was said that the legislation’s enactment of the
offence in s 117 carried a different intention from that of the common law, s 117 of the
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) was originally enacted in 1900. Again, this was long before the
concept of a duty of care in the tort of negligence was established and therefore it is certain
that at the time of drafting, the legislature did not have any such intention in mind.
170 Note that even if the criminal law had not been used to punish Joyce, tort law will still not
conflict with the criminal law: the criminal law can still be used to punish Joyce after he is
awarded compensatory damages in tort.
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in/consistency and therefore fails to grasp the simultaneous and coherent
operation of both tort law and criminal law in this context.
A second, and perhaps more crucial, observation from the anticipated
outcome of this case is that Australia’s duty-based approach may lead to
injustice. Joyce had already been punished by the criminal law. By denying his
claim in tort, the Australian approach subjects the claimant to a form of
callous and unjustified double punishment. Moreover, such a punishment is
irrational as it is determined by the level of injury caused by the tort as
opposed to a measured decision based on the plaintiff’s relative culpability in
accordance with sentencing principles.171 Even though Joyce had committed
the comparatively minor crime of stealing ladders, the application of the
illegality defence now means that he is being subjected to the additional
punishment of having to pay life-long medical expenses associated with his
serious injury. This case study indicates that Australia’s formulation of the
illegality defence can provoke unjust outcomes and fail to give effect to the
central purposes and policies of tort law, particularly that of proper
compensation.
2 The outcome according to the Canadian rule-based approach
If this case were decided through the lens of the Canadian rule-based
approach, the courts would first determine whether O’Brien had been
negligent before considering whether the defence of illegality should apply to
exempt his liability. Presuming that each of the elements of negligence can be
satisfied, the operation of the Canadian illegality rule is relatively simple
because Joyce’s case does not fall within either of the two applicable
exceptions. That is, Joyce is not profiting from his illegal actions,172 nor is he
trying to use tort law to deflect the imposition of his criminal sanction.173 As
such, it is likely that the defence will not apply and Joyce will be entitled to
compensatory damages for his loss.174
The anticipated outcome of the Canadian approach demonstrates that the
rule-based illegality defence is able to appreciate the simultaneous operation
of the criminal law and tort law. The defence does not apply in the
circumstances of this case because its two exceptions are capable of grasping
the central distinction that exists between a plaintiff seeking compensation for
loss suffered, and a genuine stultification of the criminal law.175 Thus, in
171 Goudkamp, ‘The Defence of Joint Illegal Enterprise’, above n 45, 442. See also Erbacher,
Negligence and Illegality, above n 26, 39–42.
172 As long as he claims only compensatory, and not exemplary, damages.
173 Joyce is merely seeking compensation for his injuries, rather than suing O’Brien for the cost
of the penalty imposed on him by the criminal law. This case is unlike British Columbia v
Zastowny [2008] 1 SCR 27, where the Canadian Supreme Court held that a plaintiff who
sought to be compensated in tort law for periods of unemployment due to justified
incarceration by the criminal law, would be profiting from his criminal conduct.
174 However, it is important to note here that the defence of voluntary assumption of risk or the
partial defence of contribution negligence may still apply.
175 That is, by compensating Joyce in response to O’Brien’s infringement of his private rights
the court will uphold key tort law principles and policies, which aim to compensate plaintiffs
whose private rights have been infringed upon due to the fault of another, and achieve
corrective justice between the parties. At the same time, however, Joyce will have already
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addition to promoting nuanced legal coherence, the rule-based approach
ensures that plaintiffs are not unjustifiably stripped of the right to
compensation in tort law where their private rights have been unduly violated.
The narrow application of the Canadian approach reflects McLachlin J’s
concern that the private rights of plaintiffs should be fiercely protected even if
this results in incoherence.176 In addition, it attenuates the concerns of
coherence scholars, such as Amaya, who warn that the ruthless pursuit of legal
coherence will unduly impede the incremental development of the law and
reproduce circular and conservative outcomes.177
Thus, the Canadian formulation of the defence can ultimately be praised for
identifying that, while legal coherence underscores the existence of the
illegality defence in tort, coherence should not be mercilessly pursued to the
extent of stripping plaintiffs of their long-standing civil rights without
adequate justification.
3 The outcome according to the UK discretionary-based approach
Although it does not specifically outline such an approach, the defence
adopted in the UK seems to require a court to firstly determine whether
O’Brien was negligent pursuant to the elements of the relevant cause of
action, before considering whether the illegality defence will operate.178 In
respect of the latter consideration, the three-step test endorsed in Patel v Mirza
compels the court to firstly examine the underlying purpose of the statute in
question; relevantly, ss 1 and 7 of the Theft Act 1968 (UK). The purpose of
these sections is to protect and uphold the individual right to exclusive
possession of property, by punishing and deterring those who dishonestly
acquire property.179 Nevertheless, the weight that should be attributed to the
purpose of the statute, and whether it would in fact undermine Joyce’s right to
be compensated in tort law, is unclear.
According to the second step of the test, the court is then encouraged to take
into account the relevant policy factors involved. This will likely include the
policies of tort law and, in particular the policy that tort law aims to provide
fair compensation and achieve corrective justice between the parties. Finally,
the third step of the test will consider whether the denial of the claim would
be a proportionate response to Joyce’s illegality. Given that Joyce has
committed the relatively minor crime of theft (albeit intentionally), denying
him compensation for the severe injury he sustained would arguably be an
been punished by the criminal law through a finding of guilt. Thus, the purposes of the
criminal law are also satisfied via the imposition of a criminal sentence.
176 Hall v Hebert [1993] 2 SCR 159, 177, 179–80 (McLachlin J).
177 Amaya, above n 63, 474. See also Goudkamp and Mayr, above n 31, 243.
178 In all of the cases in which the illegality defence propounded in Patel v Mirza has been
applied in tort law, the defence is considered after the relevant cause of action is made out:
see, eg, Stoffel & Co v Grondona [2018] EWCA Civ 2031 (13 September 2018); Clark v
Farley [2018] EWHC 1007 (QB) (2 May 2018); Singularis Holdings Ltd v Daiwa Capital
Markets Europe Ltd [2017] EWHC 257 (Ch). Although it should be noted that in
Henderson v Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust [2018] EWCA Civ 1841
the English Court of Appeal considered only the law on the illegality defence.
179 Which is identical to the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 117. For further analysis of this see
above n 166.
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unjust and disproportionate response to the illegality.
The reasoning undertaken in line with Lord Toulson JSC’s guided
discretionary test, demonstrates that the UK approach is nuanced and
sophisticated in the sense that it has the capacity to take into account various
factors relevant to whether the illegality defence should be applied.
Nevertheless, such reasoning now requires the purposes and policies of
criminal law, which favour the operation of the illegality defence in this fact
scenario, to be weighed against the purposes and policies of tort law as well
as the outcome of the proportionality limb, which militate in favour of
providing Joyce with an award of compensation. This dilemma reflects the
primary criticism levelled towards the UK’s discretionary approach: it
involves balancing multifarious factors without providing a common metric
against which a reasonable and justified determination can be made. In the
circumstances of this case study, it is uncertain which factors ought to prevail
and the final decision will ultimately be left to the subjective discretion of the
court.
Thus, while the UK approach has the capacity to consistently promote legal
coherence, its open-ended discretion creates problematic uncertainty.
Overall assessment
The practical application of the three conceptions of the illegality defence to
the facts of Joyce v O’Brien elucidates the unjust nature of Australia’s
duty-based approach. Not only does the conceptual basis of the approach fail
to support the underlying rationale of legal coherence; its practical application
in the context of tort law may render callous outcomes. Furthermore, on the
basis of the observations made in this case study, it can be argued that a
rule-based (as opposed to discretionary-based) approach encourages objective
decision-making and certainty in the law, whilst preserving the private rights
of plaintiffs in justified circumstances.
VI Conclusion
The analysis undertaken in this article was prompted not only in response to
the deficient attention devoted to examining the common law illegality
defence utilised in Australian tort law. It was also motivated by a concern that,
while current tort law scholarship identifies legal coherence as the primary
rationale for the illegality defence, the literature fails to satisfactorily clarify
the parameters of this criterion. To this end, this article sought to elucidate the
meaning of legal coherence in the context of illegality and, in doing so,
formulate a framework for a legal coherence analysis of the various
conceptions of the illegality defence propounded in the jurisdictions of
Australia, Canada and the UK.
In light of the findings of this article, it is clear that the Miller v Miller
formulation of the illegality defence should be questioned. Not only is this
approach underpinned by the pursuit of legal consistency and justified by
reasoning akin to judicial legislation, it also promotes outcomes that
unjustifiably strip plaintiffs of their private right to be awarded compensation.
It follows that Australian superior courts should consider reformulating the
illegality defence utilised in the general law of torts, and they should do so
with the guidance provided by the Canadian Supreme Court in Hall v Hebert.
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The foregoing analysis indicates that the rule-based approach steers the most
acceptable ‘middle course’ between the conflicting claims that underpin an
appeal to the defence of illegality.180
Nevertheless, irrespective of the approach adopted, it is our contention that
any reformulation of Australia’s illegality defence must be founded upon a
reasoned and nuanced understanding of ‘legal coherence’, as proposed by the
analytical framework articulated in this article. The Miller v Miller articulation
is problematic in its apparent failure to understand the distinction between
legal consistency and legal coherence. As a result, the duty-based defence
operates by simply substituting the purposes of tort law with those of the
criminal law. The concern, of course, is that criminal law is exclusively
focused upon offenders and whether the actus reus and mens rea of a crime
have been committed. The interests of the victim play a very minor role in an
assessment of guilt and a determination of sentence. On the other hand, tort
law is a two-sided affair, in which the ‘victim’ of tortious interference
institutes proceedings and the court is concerned with correcting and
balancing the interests of both the plaintiff and the defendant.
Consequently, if the purpose of the criminal law is artificially transposed in
tort law, the very foundation of tort law’s justificatory basis as a law of
obligation, which balances and corrects the interests of both parties, is
disturbed. It is for this reason that any reformulation of the defence must be
based on a sophisticated and nuanced understanding of legal coherence.
180 As expressed by Bingham LJ in Saunders v Edwards [1987] 1 WLR 1116, 1134.
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